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Abstract. Foreign direct investment (FDI) has become an important factor of development 
in low income countries. At the same time, corruption continues to be one of the greatest 
obstacles to economic and social development in these countries. However, in East Africa, 
the study of the nature of corruption as well as its relationship with FDI is scanty. In 
addition, the existing literature provides controversial results. Motivated by these issues, 
this paper examines the effects of corruption on FDI inflows by incorporating an 
econometric method based on panel data from 5 East African countries over the 1996-2015 
period. The paper contributes to the existing literature by modeling the relationship between 
corruption and FDI inflows using two measures of corruption, namely corruption 
perception index (CPI) and control of corruption (CC). Equally important, both economic 
factors such as GDP per capita, GDP growth, inflation and degree of openness, and quality 
of institutions or governance indicators such as voice and accountability, political stability 
and absence of violence, government effectiveness and rule of law are considered in the 
analysis. Data were obtained from Transparency International, World Bank Development 
Indicators, Worldwide Governance Indicators and United Nations Conference on Trade and 
Development. Analytically the paper uses fixed effects (FE) as the preferable model. The 
results show that the corruption level in the host country has an adverse effect on FDI 
inflows when eliminating GDP per capita in the regression. Nonetheless, the results show 
that the GDP per capita as a proxy for market size and country’s quality of institutions are 
more important than the level of corruption in encouraging FDI inflows into the country. 
The key implication of these results is that an increase in the real GDP per capita, 
improvement in the quality of institutions as well as control of corruption may be an 
important strategy for increase in FDI inflows. 
Keywords. Corruption, Foreign direct investment, Quality of institutions. 
JEL. C23, F21, F23, E02, O16. 
 
1. Introduction 
y and large, it is widely accepted that the relationship between domestic 
private investments and economic growth is positive and significant (see for 
example Epaphra & Massawe, 2016). For this reason, there is a great need 
to promote domestic saving so as to encourage domestic private investment that 
can finally increase growth. Nevertheless, a failure of the country to use its 
domestic saving to achieve growth through investment, can then allow the foreign 
saving to serve the purpose. The foreign saving to be used can be in form of loan, 
equity investment, foreign direct investment (FDI) and portfolio direct investment. 
Understandably, during the 1990-2000 period, it was witnessed a remarkable and 
consistent decrease in development assistance to developing countries forcing them 
to an alternative source of financing such as FDI. More importantly, in 1998, FDI 
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emerged as the largest source of capital for developing countries, rising from US$ 
174 billion in 1992 to US$ 664 billion in 1998 (Missama, 2010; Kiiza, 2007). 
Accordingly, FDI has been a major emphasis to both developing and transitional 
economies in securing economy-wide efficiency to a host country mainly through 
the transfer of technology and new knowledge, and increasing an access to the 
foreign market. It also improves standard of living through creation of employment 
and improving the standards and quality of goods, and transfer of new knowledge 
to a nation.  In summary, FDI plays a crucial role in the economy by serving three 
development gap: investment gap, when domestic savings are not enough to meet 
investment needs of the country; foreign exchange gap by bringing the foreign 
currency during investment and through international trade; and tax revenue gap, 
through corporate tax in various economic activities.  
It is however, important to note the limitations of FDI to less developed 
countries. For example, FDI may lead to repatriation of the profits and unfair 
advantages in competing with the domestic companies which might cause small 
and medium companies to collapse (Dabour, 2000). In fact, FDI may subsequently, 
lead to the monopolistic structure of the market (Dabour, 2000). Notwithstanding 
these limitations, the importance of FDI to the economy of a host country cannot 
be overemphasized. Politicians and policy makers have been creating the 
favourable business environment such as infrastructural development, financial 
services and social services aiming at increasing investment in their economies. 
Besides, theories and empirical studies have discussed the main determinants of 
FDI. In brief, political risk factors such as instability and corruption, weak security, 
nature of labour, infrastructure and lack of transparency in regulatory policy are 
among of the important determinants of FDI in the host economy (see for example 
Lambsdorff, 2003; Dabour, 2000). Also, factors such as structure of the domestic 
market, tax policy and inflation rate may affect foreign investors. 
The issue of corruption is relevant to the context of abundance of natural 
resources which is likely to foster rent seeking behaviour (Leite & Weidmann, 
1999). Corruption takes place in the economy where government institution has the 
great authority and can exercise discretion without respect to interpretation and 
application of regulation (CETA, 2011). Similarly, Lambsdorff (2007); Goel & 
Nelson (1998); Leite & Weidmann (1999) and Krueger (1974) suggest that 
government restrictions on economic activity tend to generate rent seeking 
behaviour, which in turn adversely affects the economy.  
Many studies show that corruption reduces the investment profits by acting as 
an additional cost to the investment. For example, Bray (2006) and Control Risks 
and Simmons & Simmons (2006) argue that companies fail to win contract or to 
gain new business because their competitor pays bribe. Also, Chêne (2014) and 
Sanyal & Samanta (2008) suggest that USA firms are less likely to invest in 
countries where corruption is widely spread. Overall, corruption discourages FDI 
in the host country and it has been considered to be a major cost to international 
business (Bray, 2006). Under this circumstance, FDI flows to corrupt countries 
from countries that criminalise corruption are less than FDI inflows from the 
countries with higher levels of corruption. 
Whilst the discussion in the preceding paragraphs is supported with both 
theoretical and empirical studies, corruption is a complex idea with different 
definitions. For instance, Transparency International describes corruption as the 
abuse of the entrusted power for the private gain which can either be a financial or 
non-financial gain. It may occur when private agents offer bribes to circumvent 
public policies and process for competitive advantage or profit. Under these 
circumstances, corruption can also have some positive effects on FDI. This counter 
argument is supported by Wei (1997) and Ohlsson (2007). According to Wei 
(1997), East Asia attracts more foreign investors regardless of its highest level of 
corruption. However, East Asia has a large market and has been growing faster 
than the world average. This is fairly direct reasoning, with a large market there are 
high incentives for foreign companies to try to conquer the local market. Besides, 
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by paying bribes a global multinational enterprise (MNE) can reduce the time for 
bureaucratic paper work. It can also skip inspections, reduce taxes, or even receive 
government funding (Ohlsson, 2007). Furthermore, in some cases governments’ 
bureaucrats receive a bribe and allow MNE to charge an over price for public 
services, so this increases the return on the FDI (Ohlsson, 2007). In addition, while 
relying on static efficiency arguments, Leite & Weidmann (1999) view bribing as a 
type of coarsen bargaining process and so, it can play a positive role in the 
development process.  
Notwithstanding the possible advantages of corruption to some MNEs the 
uncertainty and the risk of dealing with corrupt government may be higher. In fact, 
Kaufmann & Wei (1999) show that within a country, firms which pay more bribe 
spend more time on average, negotiating with the government officials. Thus, 
corruption remains a growing problem. Of central concern therefore is to examine 
the adverse effect of corruption on FDI in the host country while controlling other 
factors such as market size. This is important because corruption heightens the 
uncertainty (Habib & Zurawicki, 2002). In general, the empirical findings of this 
paper are very significant for policy makers and decision making process because 
most of the developing countries have recently shifted their emphasis in terms of 
acquiring foreign currency. For the purpose of this paper, unless specifically 
mentioned, corruption means the abuse of entrusted power for private gain. 
 
2. Descriptive Analysis of Foreign Direct Investment and 
Corruption  
Table 1 reports the global distribution of FDI during the 1990-2015 period. In 
that period grobal FDI increased by 38 percent (UNCTAD, 2016). That increase 
was contributed chiefly by changes in legal or ownership structures of MNEs, 
including tax inversions which involve large movements in the balance of payment 
with little changes in operations (UNCTAD, 2016). In 2015, FDI inflow growth 
rate in developing economies was 9.5 percent; however, in Asia, FDI inflows grew 
by 15.6 percent making it the largest FDI recipient region in the World. Markedly, 
FDI inflows in Asia increased from US$467.94bil in 2014 to US$540.72bil in 2015 
(UNCTAD, 2016). The strong performance of the economy and high population 
growth in the region are, unsurprisingly, the chief reasons for the large FDI inflows 
in Asia. An increase in GDP and population has been an incentive for the foreign 
firms to make market seeking investment. Undoubtedly, the long run relationship 
between FDI inflows and market size seems to be positive.  
 
Table 1. Growth of Foreign Direct Investment, 1990-2015 
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1990-00 20.8 22.8 23.6 27.8 19.8 14.3 16.2 -1.1 -26.1 38.1 19.7 
2001-10 5.1 2.6 8.5 11.5 12.5 22.0 23.3 22.1 46.5 16.8 13.4 
2011 12.8 16.8 10.7 19.0 7.2 9.7 -52.1 57.9 -5.3 5.7 3.5 
2012 -3.6 -3.7 1.1 -14.1 -1.7 15.4 108.8 -11.0 21.5 14.5 -4.0 
2013 -5.5 -13.6 -33.1 22.3 0.6 -5.4 -24.1 -14.1 -12.0 24 5.3 
2014 -10.5 -23.3 -5.4 -41.7 5.4 11.8 -2.8 -16.4 15.5 16.8 8.5 
2015 38.0 84.4 64.6 159.5 9.5 -7.2 8.8 -18.3 -35.9 -1.5 15.6 
Source: Authors computations using Data from UNCTAD (2016) 
 
There are also, however, further points to be considered in East Africa, West 
Africa, Central Africa and Africa in general. It can be seen from Table 1 that, 
Africa FDI flows in 2015 decreased by 7.2 percent. In West Africa and Central 
Africa the decline in FDI inflows was even worse. The UNCTAD (2016) suggests 
that the low commodity prices and a depreciation of the local currencies were the 
chief factors. These low commodity prices depressed FDI inflows in natural 
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resources based economies. Likewise, depreciation of national currencies put a 
downward pressure to MNEs on reinvesting earnings. Nonetheless, Economist 
(2011) shows that generally growth of FDI in Africa rises because the African 
countries have initiated economic and political reforms; and opened their 
economies to international trade. In the same way, FDI inflow to Sub-Saharan 
Africa (SSA) is expected to rise because the region is among the fastest growing 
regions in the world. However, the decisions to invest abroad depend on a complex 
set of factors but the least corrupt countries may attract more FDI because they 
provide a more favorable climate for investors (Castro, 2013). 
It is important to note that there is no even a single country anywhere in the 
world, which is corrupt free (Transparency International, 2015). This also suggests 
that corruption is a global threat. Corruption is principally a governance issue, a 
failure of institutions and a lack of capacity to manage society by means of a 
framework of social, judicial, political and economic checks and balances. Figure 1 
and Figure 2, respectively show the global mean CPI over the 1998-2015 period 
and the CPI for selected countries as reported by Transparency International 
(2015). In fact, as it has been presented above, there is no one single country that 
gets a perfect score and that more than two-thirds scored below 50, on a scale from 
0 (highly corrupt) to 100 (very clean) (Figure 2). According to Transparency 
International (2015), corruption undermines justice and economic development, 
and destroys public trust in government and leaders. Furthermore, Figure 1 reports 
the global average score of 4.3 on scale from 0 (highly corrupt) to 10 (very clean) 
during the 1998-2015 period. Notably, European Union and Western Europe had 
an average score of 6.7 whereas Asian Pacific and Americas had average scores of 
4.3 and 4.0, respectively. Other regions such as Middle East and Northern Africa, 
Eastern Europe and Central Asia, and Sub Saharan Africa had the lowest scores of 
3.9, 3.3 and 3.3 respectively. Overall, Denmark and Finland have the highest scores 
in the world, whereas Northern Korea and Somalia and Afghanistan are among the 
most corrupt countries in the world. 
In 2005, corruption was observed to be a greater problem to the poorest 
countries. In that year the global score stood at 2.6 out of 10 a clean index. Clearly, 
in that time there was an inclusion of new least developed countries namely Chad, 
Bangladesh, Turkmenistan, Myanmar and Haiti into the list. Without question, 
these countries are among the poorest countries in the world. It is important to note 
however, that even developed countries are observed to be victims of corruption. 
This point is supported by the scores of Spain, South Korea, Greece and Italy of 
5.8, 5.6, 4.6 and 4.4 out of 10 respectively.  
The gentle slope of the global average CPI indicates that the world’s control of 
corruption has been improving albeit insipidly. This situation raises great interest to 
economists and policy makers because literature suggests that corruption reduces 
both investment and economic growth (see for example Arvas & Atta, 2011; Leite 
& Weidmann, 1999; Murphy et al., 1993; Romer, 1994; and Shleifer & Visny, 
1993). Unquestionably, corruption affects decision making associated with 
investment and composition of investment and consequently it may lead to a 
reduced both domestic and foreign investments. It may also lead to less efficient 
but more manipulatable projects and distorted composition of government 
expenditure away from infrastructure, health and education (Wei, 2005).  
According to Ravi (2015) corruption affects foreign firms in many ways including 
increment of cost of doing business in a host country. It may also create uncertainty 
for corporation such as in a process of obtaining a required license (Ravi, 2015). 
Similarly, corruption remains a huge challenge for East African economies. In 
2015, South Sudan, Burundi, Kenya and Uganda were the most corrupt countries in 
the East Africa region with scores of 15, 21, 25 and 25 out of 100, respectively 
(Transparency International, 2015). Other East African countries, namely Tanzania 
and Rwanda had scores of 30 and 54 respectively (Transparency International, 
2015). These data suggest that the Government of Rwanda has undertaken serious 
measures including immense political will and public support that led to a low 
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level of corruption relative to other countries in the region. Over the 1996-2010, 
Rwanda moved from 20.0 percent score in 1996 to 70.8 percent in 2010, emerging 
the fourth least corrupt country out of 53 countries in Africa after Botswana (79.9 
percent), Cape Verde (74.6 percent) and Mauritius (73.2 percent) (See also World 
Bank Worldwide Governance Indicators, 2011 and the Republic of Rwanda, 2012). 
Undoubtedly, Rwanda is the least corrupt country in the East African region even 
by the transparency report. For example, in 2011, Burundi, Kenya, Uganda, 
Tanzania and Rwanda scores were 1.9, 2.2, 2.4, 3 and 5 respectively (Transparency 
International, 2015). For detailed description of corruption and the correlation 
between corruption and FDI inflows, we present the 2015corruption rank/index and 
the trends of the variables during the 1996-2015 period. Table 2 reports the 
corruption rank and index across East African countries whereas Figures 3 
illustrates the trends of corruption (right scale) and FDI per capita (left scale) for 
individual East African countries. Furthermore, Figure 4 presents the trends of FDI 
in US$ millions for the countries in consideration over the 1990-2015 period. 
 
 
Figure 1. Global Mean Corruption Perception Index, 1998-2015 
Source: Authors’ computations using Transparency International Data (2016) 
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Figure 2. CPI, 2015: Selected Countries. 
Note: The Corruption Perceptions Index ranks countries and territories based on how corrupt their public sector is 
perceived to be. A country or territory’s score indicates the perceived level of public sector corruption on a scale 
of 0 (highly corrupt) to 100 (very clean). A country or territory's rank indicates its position relative to the other 
countries and territories in the index (Transparency International, 2015) 
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and 150th out of 167 countries in the Transparency International Corruption 
Perception Index1 (Table 2). In fact, they scored 15 and 21 respectively. These 
scores, on a scale of 10 to 100, mean that South Sudan and Burundi are ranked 
among the world’s most corrupt countries. Understandably, the problem of 
corruption in Burundi might have been heightened by uncertainty generated by the 
prolonged civil conflict of 1990s.  
Nonetheless, it should not be considered that the other East African countries 
except Rwanda are less corrupt. Indeed, in 2015 Kenya and Uganda scored 25 out 
of 100 and ranked 139th out 167 countries whereas Tanzania scored 30 and ranked 
117th out of 167 countries. These scores and ranks suggest that corruption in East 
Africa is pervasive and entrenched. Apparently, Kenya and Uganda are also ranked 
among the world’s most corrupt countries. In these countries, allegations of 
irregularities in public tenders are frequent (US Department of State, 2015). 
In practice, corruption hampers both domestic and foreign business activities 
(US Department of State, 2015). For example, contracts are awarded to foreign 
firms that allegedly do not comply with public procurement laws. Consequently, 
the East-African relationship with foreign investments has been turbulent and the 
region loses its overall appeal to foreign investors due to political unrest and 
corruption (US Department of State, 2015). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1 The index measures the overall extent of corruption, in terms of frequency and the size of the bribes, in both the 
public and the private sector. The score indicates the perceived level of private and public sector corruption on a 
scale of 0-100, where 0 means that the country is perceived as highly corrupt and 100 means it is perceived as 
clean. 
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Notably, foreign investors are usually attracted by a relatively stable 
environment (Agarwal & Ramaswami, 1992) in which corruption tends to be 
comparatively low. Furthermore, the quality of country political institutions, its 
democracy, good governance, and law and order are often considered as the main 
drivers of FDI (FitzGerald, 2001; Blomstrom & Kokko, 2001; Abbott & De Vita, 
2001). Indeed, Busse & Hefeker (2007) argue that political stability, socio-
economic condition, law and order, democratic accountability and the issue of 
bureaucracy are, inter alia, responsible for attraction of foreign entities.  
To be able to succinctly describe the ease of doing business in East Africa, we 
use the World Bank’s 2015 Ease of Doing Business report (Table 2). As can be 
seen in the Table, Rwanda ranks high in the World Bank's Ease of Doing Business 
Index, and at the same time scores high CPI of 54 out of 100 suggesting that 
Rwanda is among the World’s less corrupt countries. Notwithstanding the 
business-friendly reputation in Rwanda, FDI inflows in this country lag well 
behind Tanzania, Uganda and Kenya (Figure 4). Low level of FDI in Rwanda is 
chiefly contributed to high transport costs, a small domestic market, limited access 
to affordable financing, inadequate infrastructure, ambiguous tax rules, and an 
under-skilled workforce ill-suited to the needs of foreign investors (US Department 
of State, 2015). 
Tanzania and Kenya generally have favorable attitude toward FDI and have had 
considerable success in attracting it. Explicitly, Tanzania attracts the highest share 
of FDI in the East Africa region (Figure 4). The economy of Tanzania attracts FDI 
inflows mainly in sectors such mining, manufacturing and the recent development 
of the Southern Agricultural Growth Corridor of Tanzania (SAGCOT). Also, 
natural gas off the southern coast of the country has chiefly influenced foreign 
investment. Different from many other countries in the region, the investment 
climate in Kenya is characterized by stable monetary and fiscal conditions. 
Moreover, Kenya has a strong telecommunications infrastructure, a robust financial 
sector, and solid aviation connections both within Africa and to Europe and Asia 
(US Department of State, 2015). Surprisingly, Tanzania and Kenya rank 131st and 
136th of 189 countries, respectively, in the World Bank's Ease of Doing Business 
Index whereas Rwanda ranks 46th, third best in Africa behind Mauritius and South 
Africa.  
Uganda and Burundi rank 150th and 152nd of 189 countries, respectively, in the 
World Bank Doing Business 2015 report. Using East African countries’ data, one 
may conclude that there is certainly, correlation between overall easy of doing 
business, corruption and FDI inflows. For example, Burundi is one of the most 
corrupt countries in the region and ranking low in easy of doing business, as a 
result, the country attracts very low level of FDI inflows in the region (Figure 4). 
An increase in corruption tends to discourage the FDI inflows in the country. This 
is because investors become too uncertain about the costs that will be involved in 
the future. Moreover, this may be accompanied with the macroeconomic instability 
in the country such as inflation and weak currency rate.  
Admittedly, corruption is an essential means for assessing the business 
environment of a country. However, the relationship between corruption and FDI is 
more complex. Given that there are many determinants of FDI and corruption, it is 
hard to determine how each factor determines a country in relation to FDI and 
corruption. An empirical analysis of corruption and FDI in this case is of great 
significance. In this paper, CC and CPI are used independently as corruption 
indicators. Specifically, the effect of these factors on FDI is used to identify the 
corruption effects on FDI in the panel data setting. CPI is constructed as a joint 
measure of different corruption channels and is recognized in terms of validity and 
reliability (Lancaster & Montinola, 2001). It is interesting to analyze possible 
effect of corruption on FDI inflows, because as shown in Figures 5 and 6, there is a 
clear strong correlation between CPI and FDI on one hand and control of 
corruption and FDI on the other, for the countries included in the analysis. 
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Figure 3. FDI and CPI Rate: East African Countries 
Source: Authors computations using UNCTAD and TI data 1996-2015 
 
 
Figure 4. FDI Inflows in East African Countries 
Source: Authors computations using UNCTAD Data, 1990-2015 
These scatter plots provide a rough indication of importance of CPI rank and 
control of corruption on FDI inflows of the countries in consideration. Also, they 
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suggest that CPI and control of corruption are indeed driving forces for FDI in East 
Africa. 
 
 
Figure 5. Correlation between CPI and FDI in 5 East Africa, 1996-2015 
Source: Authors’ computations 
 
 
Figure 6. Correlation between CC and FDI in 5 East Africa, 1996-2015 
Source: Authors’ computations 
 
 
3. Literature Review 
A number of theories explain the motives behind FDI. For example a 
behavioural theory of firms developed by Aharoni (1966) describes the external 
and internal forces that initiate FDI. In particular, according to Aharoni (1966), 
initiating forces that originate from the external environment include proposals 
from foreign governments, distributors of the company’s products and clients, or a 
fear of losing market, or strong market competition from abroad in the home 
market. The initiating forces that stem from within the organization include drive 
of a predetermined internationalization strategy and drive of an influential decision 
maker such as strong interest of a high-ranking executive inside the organization 
for a particular FDI. In addition to external and internal forces, auxiliary forces 
such as creation of a new market for products, utilization of old machinery and 
capitalization of know-how may enhance the impact of initiating forces. 
The three fundamental factors in the initial investment decision are uncertainty, 
information and commitment. An equally significant aspect of the behaviour theory 
is that its framework is based on the assumption that FDI location decision-making 
processes and final choice are contingent upon interactions between the 
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environmental, firm and decision maker context under which the decision is made. 
Each of these theoretical positions makes an important contribution to our 
understanding that foreign investment decision is complex social process that is 
influenced by social relationships both within and outside the firm. Despite its 
importance it seems to have, particularly in the initial investment decision making, 
certainly, the behaviour theory does not go unchallenged. For example, the analysis 
of the theory does not lead to testable empirical hypotheses. In addition, the sample 
size used for analysis is too small (see also Shin, 1998).  
Another significant theory of FDI is the international product life cycle theory 
(IPLC). IPLC describes the role attributed to MNEs in the interaction between 
technology, international production and trade (Posner, 1961; Hufbauer, 1966; 
Vernon, 1966; Hirsch, 1967 and Wells, 1983) and it takes into account the role of 
innovation and the diffusion of knowledge (Hermannsdottir, 2008 and Hennart, 
1982). The main argument is that development of technology generates changes in 
the products’ factors intensity, which in turn leads to changes in the comparative 
advantages of countries. According to this model, companies go through stages 
from export to FDI (Melin, 1992; Sakarya, et al., 2007) where products typically 
pass through the phase of introduction, growth and maturity (Almor, et al., 2006). 
Table 3 summarizes the three stages of IPLC model. 
 
Table 3. Three Stages of International Product Life Cycle Model 
Stage 1: Introduction Stage 2: Growth Stage 3: Maturity 
 
Production activities are 
located in the developed 
country where the 
product was developed 
 
Export activities increase 
and finally the 
production activities are 
located in proximity to 
consumers in other 
developed countries 
 
 
Production activities are 
located in less developed 
countries where costs are 
low 
 
The product is exported 
into other industrial 
markets 
The firm exports its 
product from the less 
developed country back 
to the original 
innovating country 
Source: Hermannsdottir (2008) 
 
In the introduction stage the product is newly produced by the innovating firm 
in its home market (Agarwal, 1980) where the product was developed (Almor et 
al., 2006; Luo et al., 2005; Melin, 1992 and Hermannsdottir, 2008). At this stage, 
the firm basically exports the new product to foreign markets. Exporting process 
enables the firm to acquire enough knowledge about the foreign market. As a 
result, the firm may shift production abroad (Hermannsdottir, 2008; Kwon & Hu, 
1995; Melin, 1992; Sikorski & Menkhoff, 2000). 
In the growth stage export activities increase and the demand for products rise 
leading into additional markets (Hermannsdottir, 2008). Accordingly, as both 
export and demand for products increase, the innovators locate production 
activities in proximity to consumers in these countries (Hermannsdottir, 2008; 
Almor et al., 2006; Galán & González-Benito, 2001; Lou, Zhao & Du, 2005; 
Melin, 1992). 
The next phase is maturity stage. At this stage major markets are saturated and a 
definite degree of standardization of the product takes place (Melin, 1992). Also, 
products are exported to developed countries with the highest level of income. 
Expansion of demand and growing competition in these markets lead eventually to 
FDI of the innovator into countries for local production of the product (Shin, 
1998). In fact, Dunning (1993) suggests that MNCs would prefer to invest the 
foreign countries rather than exporting to these countries because of access to 
resources, access to markets, efficiency gains and acquisition of strategic assets. At 
this stage, the need for flexibility declines due to an increase in the degree of 
standardization. Also, a commitment to some set of product standards opens up 
technical possibilities for achieving economies of scales through mass output 
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(Hermannsdottir, 2008). By and large, the production will be located in less 
developed countries where labour costs and other factor costs such as land and 
material are lower (Vernon 1971; Almor et al., 2006; Lou, Zhao & Du, 2005; 
Melin, 1992; Sikorski & Menkhoff, 2000) and that firms will export their products 
from the less developed countries back to the original innovating country (Sikorski 
& Menkhoff, 2000 and Hermannsdottir, 2008). 
It is however, important to note the limitations of the product cycle theory. 
Understandably, the theory was modified by Vernon (1971; 1974a; 1974b) to take 
into account factor costs such as labour, land and material cost.  Also, Hirsch 
(1976) and Agmon & Hirsch (1979), respectively, specify the conditions which 
influence a firm’s choice to serve a foreign market through export or FDI and 
elaborate these conditions to differentiate between developed and developing 
countries (see also Shin, 1998). Despite these modifications, the applicability of the 
product cycle hypothesis is still restricted to highly innovative industries (Solomon, 
1978). In addition, the theory does not cover the new phenomenon of investment 
by LDC firms in DC market (Shin, 1998). 
An equally important theory is Internalisation Theory of FDI coined by Bucklet 
& Casson (1976). Initially, the theory was launched by Coase in 1937 in a national 
context and Hymer in 1976 in an international context. The theory is based on the 
application of the market imperfections approach in an international context. The 
most compelling augment under the theory is that firms try to maximise profits 
under the imperfect market condition existing in intermediate products by 
internalizing the key intermediate products such as knowledge, marketing, human 
capital and management expertise (Bucklet & Casson, 1976). As Johanson & 
Mattsson (1987) and Madhok (1997) point out, a high level of transaction cost 
results in a preference for internalizing the transaction. Significantly, presence of 
externalities in goods or factor markets provides the firm with incentive to 
internalise such markets (Rugman, 1980). In fact, the firms decide to internalize 
process across frontiers leading to FDI, provided that the replacement of the 
external imperfect markets reduces transaction costs, and that such reduction in 
cost is greater than the cost of organizing such activities internally. The benefits of 
internalization include, inter alia, efficient exploitation of market power, avoidance 
of buyer uncertainty and minimization of government intervention. It is also 
important to note that internalization is associated with administrative, 
communication and risk-taking costs. Nonetheless, these costs are expected to be 
lower the less different the foreign market is from the home market. For this 
reason, international expansion is likely start in nearby markets (see Johanson & 
Mattsson, 1987 and Hermannsdottir, 2008). More significantly, internalization 
process may continue up to the point where the benefit and costs associated with 
further internalization are equalized at the margin (Shin, 1998). 
One of the main limitations of internalization theory, however, is that although 
the theory clearly shows that MNCs do bypass the market in intermediate products, 
through direct investment, it is not certain that the motive for internalization is the 
external market’s efficiency in terms of relatively high costs (Petrochilos, 1989; 
Agarwal, 1980; Hennat, 1982). Also, according to Agarwal (1980), the theory 
cannot explain FDI in the short run, especially by smaller firms operating in one or 
two foreign countries (see also Shin, 1998). Moreover, although the theory 
acknowledges the risk of host government intervention, it fails to differentiate the 
magnitude of this risk across various industries (Nayak & Choudhury, 2014). 
Notwithstanding these limitations of internalization theory, its popularity remains 
largely undiminished. In fact, the theory can be effective in explaining Greenfield 
investments. 
In another development, Dunning (1977) put forward the concept of the eclectic 
paradigm of international production basing on market imperfections2. The eclectic 
 
2
 The model is eclectic because it integrates distinct explanatory approaches from different theories into one single 
framework (Ekeledo & Sivakumar, 1998; Glückler, 2006). 
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theory follows the line of the original Hymer (1976)-Kindleberger (1969) approach 
but it also considers local advantages of the host country (Petrochilos, 1989). The 
theory comprises of three different theories of direct foreign investments namely 
ownership-specific advantages (O), location-specific advantages (L) and 
internalization-specific advantages (I), hence dubbed OLI. Certainly, the firm’s 
decision to enter a foreign market and the choice of entry form depend on a 
combination of these three advantages that are necessary conditions for entry into 
foreign markets (Dunning, 1988) (See Figure 6). 
As Figure 6 shows, a firm will engage in FDI if the three conditions are 
satisfied. First, the firm must possess net ownership advantages over firms of other 
nationalities, which are exclusive or firm-specific proprietary, such as patents (see 
also Shin, 1998). These tangible and intangible assets may be transferred within 
transnational companies at low costs, leading either to higher incomes or reduced 
costs (Ekeledo & Sivakumar, 1998; Mtigwe, 2006; Hermannsdottir, 2008 and 
Denisia, 2010).  According to Shin, (1998), firms are able to develop new products, 
skills in marketing, organization or finance and expertise in differentiating products 
with the imperfectly competitive market. This monopolistic advantages developed 
by firms must be sufficient to offset the additional costs of operating in an 
unfamiliar foreign environment. However, costs arise from factors such as cultural, 
legal, institutional and linguistic differences and lack of knowledge of local market 
conditions may prove barrier to FDI by small firms. This suggests that, to 
successfully enter a foreign market, company’s own specific advantages such as 
patents and trademarks, technology, economies of large scale and greater access to 
financial capital must lead to higher marginal profitability or lower marginal cost 
than other competitors (Dunning, 1973). 
 
Choice of a foreign market  and 
Choice of an entry form 
     
     
Ownership-specific 
advantage 
 Location-specific 
Advantage 
 Internalizing-specific 
Advantage 
 
Tangible and 
intangible assets 
  
Attractiveness of a 
market 
 Benefits of retaining 
tangible and 
intangible assets 
within the firm 
Compensates for 
liability of 
foreignness 
 
 The fit between the 
chosen market and 
the firm’s strategy 
  
Can reduce 
transaction cost 
Continual 
reinvestment needed 
    
Figure 6. Eclectic theory: Firm’s specific advantages needed when entering foreign 
markets. 
Source: Hermannsdottir (2008) 
 
Second, when the first condition is satisfied, it must be more advantageous for 
the company possessing these unique assets to use them itself through FDI, rather 
than sell them or lease the rights to foreign firms (Denisia, 2010 and Shin, 1998). 
Notably, location advantages of different countries are key factors to determining 
who will become host countries for the activities of the transnational corporations 
(Denisia, 2010). Moreover, favourable government incentives or regulations in 
different locations and the desire to reduce transaction costs are a strong incentive 
for relocating production to particular offshore locations (Mtigwe, 2006) and can 
give the firm great advantage over its rivals (Hermannsdottir, 2008). 
Third, assuming the first two conditions are fulfilled, it must be profitable for 
the firm to use its advantages through production outside its home country rather 
than through exports (Dunning, 1973 and Shin, 1998). In other words, 
internalization advantages accrue to firm from the internal use of its ownership 
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advantages rather than renting them out to external parties in the form of licensing 
agreements or franchising (Mtigwe, 2006).  It can be seen from the analysis of OLI 
framework that as cross-border market internalization benefit is higher the more 
the firm will want to engage in foreign production rather than offering this right 
under license, franchise. However, as Denisia (2010) points out, it is important to 
note that eclectic paradigm parameters are different from company to company and 
depend on context and reflect the economic, political, social characteristics of the 
host country. The main limitation of the eclectic theory is that, since the advantages 
due to ownership, location and internalization may change over time, if country-
specific characteristics are important determinants of FDI, it may be invalid to 
generalize from one country’s experience to another (Petrochilos, 1989).  
Given, the high profile debate with regard to FDI, it is quite unsurprising that 
there many other theories of FDI. These include, inter alia, the Uppsala model 
(Andersson, 2000; Collinson & Houlden, 2005; Johanson & Wiedersheim-Paul, 
1975; 2004), the Oligopolistic theory explaining FDI,  (Knickerbocker, 1973), FDI 
theory based on strength of currency (Aliber, 1970; Caves, 1988; Froot & Stein, 
1991 and De Mello, 1997), FDI theories related to international trade (Graham, 
1996; and Helpman et al., 2003; Smith, 1776; Ricardo, 1817), the Theory of 
Exchange Rates on Imperfect Capital Markets (Itagaki, 1981 and Cushman, 1985), 
Theories of FDI based on perfect competition (MacDougall, 1960; Kemp, 1964; 
Simpson, 1962, Frankel, 1965, Pearce & Rowan, 1966, Caves, 1971; Kindleberger, 
1969 and Hymer, 1976). By and large, corruption is now recognized as a policy 
variable that affects almost all aspects of social and economic life, especially in 
developing countries (Freckleton et al., 2011). According to Mauro (1995) 
corruption slows down the economic growth of a country and has an adverse effect 
on the investment level. 
Theories aside, there are a number of empirical studies that examine the   
relationship between corruption and FDI inflows in the host country. To this end, 
various models and methodologies such as fixed effect and random models of 
panel data as well as cross sectional data have been applied. However, there is no 
certain result on the effect of corruption on FDI inflows. In fact, some studies find 
a positive relationship between corruption and FDI (Leff, 1964; Al-Sadig, 2009; 
Bardhan, 1997) while others reveal a negative relationship between the variables 
(Hines, 1995; Al-Sadig, 2009; Egger & Winner, 2006; Habib & Zurawicki, 2002; 
Mathur & Sigh, 2013). Also, there studies that show that corruption can have both 
positive and negative effects on FDI (see for example, Campos et al., 2010). 
Corruption may have a positive effect on FDI inflows in the sense that it is 
considered to be a greasing wheel to the host country with rigid regulations and 
inefficiency bureaucracy (Bardhan, 1997). In a similar fashion, Udenze (2014) 
finds an insignificant positive relationship between perceived corruption and FDI 
inflows for the 22 Sub Saharan African countries, but a significant negative 
relationship for the low and middle income countries outside Sub-Saharan Africa. 
This also suggests that the effect of corruption on investment varies significantly 
across regions. For example, Asiedu & Freeman (2009) find that corruption is the 
most determinant and has a significant negative effect on the investment in 
transition countries but with no significant impact for firms in Latin America and 
sub-Saharan Africa. Besides, Egger & Winner (2006) suggest that corruption has a 
negative effect on FDI for any of the 59 OECD and non-OECD economies 
analyzed.   
Certainly, there is no shortage of disagreement within the study of corruption 
and FDI. For example, with cross sectional data of 52 developing countries, Akcay 
(2001) fails to evidence a negative relationship between corruption and FDI 
inflows and concludes that the most significant determinants of FDI are market 
size, openness, labour costs and corporate tax rates. Similarly, King (2003) reveals 
no significant relationship between corruption and FDI when combined with other 
determinants of FDI, but finds a significant negative effect of corruption on FDI 
when corruption is used alone. According to King (2003) corruption indirectly 
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affects FDI through factors such as infrastructure, privatization, oil and growth. In 
the same manner, Marthur & Sigh (2011) show a negative relationship between 
FDI and corruption, however they suggest that a host country market size and GDP 
growth rate, productivity of labour and the level of trade-to-GDP ratio, are the 
significant determinants of the ability of the host country to attract FDI. More 
democratic countries may receive less FDI flows if economic freedom or economic 
reforms are not guaranteed (Marthur & Sigh, 2011).  
Both theoretical and empirical perspectives on the effect of corruption on FDI 
inflows make an important contribution to our understanding that it is important to 
control for the other determinants of FDI to improve the accuracy of the estimation 
of the relationship between perceived corruption and FDI inflows. This argument is 
also supported by evidence from Yasmin et. al, (2003). According to Yasmin et. al, 
(2003) factors such as  trade openness, GDP growth, inflation rate, GDP per capita, 
gross capital formation, days to start a business and number of procedures to start a 
business should be taken into account when analyzing the relationship between 
corruption and FDI inflows. Moreover, Wei (2000) shows that corruption aside, an 
increase in tax rate to the multinational enterprises may lead to the decrease of FDI 
inflows. 
Further, evidence for in support of the position that corruption has a negative 
effect on FDI, however, suggests that a negative relationship may be contributed by 
the failure to control a quality institution (Al-Sadig, 2009). Also, according to Wei 
(2001a) and Abed & Dovooddi (2000) when a strong institutional factor is included 
in the model then there will be an insignificant relationship between FDI and 
Corruption. This also indicates that the country with a good quality institution can 
be able to attract more FDI inflows despite its level of corruption. Likewise, the 
effect of corruption on FDI depends on both the size of the corruption and the 
nature of the corruption (Ravi, 2015). To support this argument, Ravi (2015) show 
that corruption in India has a detrimental effect on FDI, whereas in China has the 
opposite effect because corruption in China is low while in India is very high. A 
similar explanation is that predictable corruption 3  cannot necessarily adversely 
affect investor’s ability to predict future activities while unpredictable corruption 
creates insecurity and uncertainty business environment (see for example King, 
2003). Indeed, Ngowi (2001) shows that the high risk of doing business which is 
caused by the lack of political and institutional stability and predictability prevent 
FDI inflows in Africa. This negative relationship between political instability and 
FDI inflows is supported by Al-Sadig (2009). These instabilities create uncertainty 
of the protection of the property right and hence reduce investment and productive 
activities (Mo, 2001). 
Habib & Zurawicki (2002) show that the effect of corruption on FDI negative 
and consequently, foreigner  usually avoid to invest in countries with high level of 
corruption as they are afraid of operational inefficiencies. In addition, Habib & 
Zurawicki (2002) reveal that there are positive and significant effects of the 
population, GDP per capita and economic ties on FDI level. 
Despite the controversies about the relationship between corruption and FDI 
inflows, it should be pointed out that corruption is not the only variable that 
possibly affects FDI inflows. Undoubtedly, there is a vast literature on the 
determinants of FDI. Such factors include inter alia, economic growth, population, 
institutional quality, political stability, degree of openness, democracy or rule of 
law or regulatory quality and economic stability. This paper contributes to the 
existing literature on the relationship between CPI and FDI in East African 
countries. The paper also analyzes a broader set of institutional variables such as 
rule of law, regulatory quality, voice and accountability, political stability and 
absence of violence, government effectiveness and control of corruption. This is 
 
3 It exists when bribes are paid and goods or services are delivered, and the bribe payer feels assured of 
deliverance. For example ccorruption is very predictable where costs of services is easily estimated and clients 
feels guaranteed. 
Turkish Economic Review 
 TER, 4(1), M. Epaphra, & J. Massawe, p.19-54. 
35 
35 
due to the fact that not all institutional dimensions have the same importance for 
the decision of where to invest. Moreover, the paper considers economic variables 
such as inflation and degree of openness as well as demographic factors such 
urbanization that may affect the decision of foreign investors to undertake 
investment projects in a particular country.  
 
3. The Model 
As it has been discussed, Dunning (1988) developed the eclectic theory that is 
generally grounded in the ownership, location, and internalization paradigm (OLI). 
In the OLI framework, the ownership (O) factor addresses the “why” aspect of 
foreign production; the location (L) factor addresses “where” to locate foreign 
production; and the internalization (I) factor addresses “how” firms internalize 
markets (Quazi et al., 2014). Various studies suggest that corruption can influence 
the L factor by affecting the locational advantage of a host country as well as the 
internalization (I) factor by raising transaction costs (Quazi et al., 2014;  Habib & 
Zurawicki, 2002; Caetano & Caleiro, 2005). In view of these arguments, this paper 
applies a panel data analysis to examine the causal relationship between corruption 
and FDI in East Africa. With a panel data there will be a greater degree of freedom. 
In line with Al-Sadig (2009) and Quazi et al. (2014), the estimation model is 
expressed as: 
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Where i is the country subscript, t  is the time subscript, s  are unknown 
parameters to be estimated,  is the usual random disturbance term, and is the 
unobserved country-specific effects. The dependent variable, GDP per capita and 
degree of openness are in logarithm form. Table 3 summarizes the definitions and 
descriptions of the variables.  
The dependent variable is total FDI inflows a host country receives at time t  
divided by the host country’s total population, that is, FDI per capita. Al-Sadig, 
2009 also uses the same measure of FDI. This represents the inflows of foreign 
investment into a country. The key regressors is the corruption level in the host 
country as measured by CPI in line with Quazi et al. (2014), Wei (2000a), Habib & 
Zurawicki (2002), Zhao et al. (2003), Voyer & Beamish (2004), Ketkar et al. 
(2005), and Egger & Winner (2006) and control of corruption in line with 
Belgibayeva & Plekhanov, (2015) and Daude & Stein, (2004). Since corruption is 
illegal, it is very hard to find good statistics on the level of corruption (Ohlsson, 
2007). In most cases it is done in secret, so only some cases are discovered and 
therefore, the amount of cases discovered is not a good measure of the actual 
corruption, because that also depends on other factors, as the judicial system 
(Ohlsson, 2007). As a result, CPI is widely considered as a proxy measure of 
corruption level of a country. It is published by the Transparency International. The 
CPI ranges from 0 to 10, with 10 being no corruption and 0 being countries where 
business is totally corrupt. This also implies that a lower CPI score reflects more 
corruption. If the estimated coefficient of the CPI index,
2 , turned out positive, 
would literally mean that the higher corruption index (very clean) attracts more 
FDI supporting the “grabbing hand” hypothesis (Quazi et al., 2014). In contrast, a 
negative coefficient will indicate that lower CPI scores (i.e., more corruption) 
attract more FDI, validating the “helping hand” hypothesis. In fact, according to 
Bardhan (1997), the negative relationship between FDI and CPI index suggests that 
corruption acts as a greasing wheel for the rigid regulations and an inefficient 
bureaucracy country so as to speed up decision making and bureaucratic efficiency. 
The annual CPI data are obtained from Transparency International. The control of 
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corruption which is also one of the indicators of governance performance or quality 
of institutions is as defined and explained in Table 4. 
The choice of the control variables is motivated by the previous empirical 
studies on the determinants of FDI, the eclectic paradigm of Dunning (1988) and 
the availability of data. For example, domestic demand in host countries can play a 
crucial role in attracting “market seeking” FDI, where the primary objective of 
multinational corporations (MNCs) is to serve the domestic market (Quazi et al., 
2014). Market size supports the horizontal nature of FDI that seeks to extend and 
increase their market base. Also, when a product cycle of the firm reaches its peak, 
it will be starting to look for the foreign markets with the large market and higher 
purchasing power (Jordaan, 2004) for efficient utilization of resources and 
exploitation of the economies of scale (Charkrabarti, 2001). In addition, according 
to Yu & Walsh (2010), a larger FDI flows to the countries with the larger market 
potentials because of larger potential demand and lower costs associated with 
economies of scale. In fact, Chakrabarti (2001) suggests that market size of the 
host country measured by GDP per capita passes the robustness test as a significant 
determinant of FDI. GDP per capita is a good estimate of the disposable income 
and of the well being of each person. With a higher living standard, the level of 
consumption should be more sophisticated, leading to increase in FDI (Ohlsson, 
2007; Demirhan & Masca, 2008). In this case, GDP per capita is expected to have a 
positive impact on FDI. However, the result of relationship between FDI and GDP 
per capita as a proxy of market size is not straight forward. For example, Anywanu 
(2011) finds a negative relationship between the two variables suggesting that this 
could be due to balancing of the market size effect with the cost of production 
effect, which should work in the opposite direction. In line with previous empirical 
studies log of GDP per capita is used in this paper as proxy variable for market size 
or potential (Al-Sadig, 2009; Quazi et al., 2014; Schneider & Frey, 1985; Loree & 
Guisinger, 1995; Jaspersen et al., 2000; Wei, 2000a and Quazi et al., 2014). 
To control for the host country’s market size and market potential, other 
variables such as the growth rate of GDP (GDPG), and the growth rate of 
population (POPG) are used (see for example Al-Sadig, 2009). The argument about 
the growth rate of GDP is that a region that has experienced impressive economic 
growth in the past is likely to attract more foreign investors (Yin et al., 2014). In 
the same line, Demirhan & Masca (2008) and Charkrabarti (2001) argue that only 
rapidly growing economy provides relative better opportunities for making profits 
than the ones growing slowly. Rapid growth creates a large domestic demand and 
business opportunities for foreign firms. Similarly, if a country’s population is 
growing very fast, this may serve as a catalyst for FDI inflows (Al-Sadig, 2009). 
An increase in population may increase the demand for different products in the 
country or may result into a decrease in production costs via reduced wages (Li et 
al., 2004). A cheaper labour at the host country than at the home tends to attract 
efficiency seeking FDI. Foreign investors aim to take advantage of the host 
country’s cheaper factor inputs (Yin et al., 1998). Accordingly, the relationship 
between FDI and these variables is expected to be positive. 
Likewise, economically open countries generally pursue economic policies that 
are conducive to foreign trade and investment (Quazi et al., 2014). The fact that 
foreign investors typically have favorable impressions of such countries with 
greater degree of openness, the openness of the economy (OPEN) which is 
measured by the sum of exports and imports as a percentage of GDP is expected to 
have a positive effect on FDI (see for example  Demirhan & Masca, 2008; 
Anywanu, 2011 and Al-Sadig, 2009). 
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Table 4. Descriptions of Variables 
Variable Abbrev. Definition Source Expected 
Sign 
Foreign direct 
investment  
FDI FDI percent of population UNCTAD, 
WDI, 2016 
 
Corruption CPI Corruption Perception Index  




corruptHighly
cleanVery
Index
:0
:10  
Transparency 
International, 
1996-2016 
+ 
Market size GDPPC GDP (in current US$) divided 
by population (i.e. Per capita 
GDP) 
WDI, 2016 + 
Growth GDPG Growth rate of GDP, Annual 
percent 
WDI, 2016 + 
Rule of law RL Extent to which agents have 
confidence in and abide by the 
rules of society (-2.5:2.5 scale) 
Worldwide 
Governance 
Indicator, 2016 
+ 
Regulatory 
quality 
RQ Perceptions of the ability of the 
government to formulate & 
implement sound policies and 
regulations that permit and 
promote private sector 
development (-2.5:2.5 scale) 
Worldwide 
Governance 
Indicators, 
2016 
+ 
Voice and 
Accountability  
VA Perception of the extent to which 
citizens are able to participate in 
selecting their government, 
freedom of expression, 
association, and a free media (-
2.5:2.5 scale) 
Worldwide 
Governance 
Indicators, 
2016 
+ 
Political 
stability & 
absence of 
violence 
/terrorism 
PV 
 
Perceptions of the likelihood of 
political instability and/or 
politically-motivated violence, 
including terrorism (-2.5:2.5 
scale) 
Worldwide 
Governance 
Indicators, 
2016 
+ 
Government 
effectiveness  
GE Perceptions of the quality of 
public services, civil service and 
the degree of its independence 
from political pressures (-2.5:2.5 
scale) 
Worldwide 
Governance 
Indicators, 
2016 
+ 
Control of 
Corruption 
CC Perceptions of the extent to 
which public power is exercised 
for private gain, including petty 
and grand forms of corruption. (-
2.5:2.5 scale) 
Worldwide 
Governance 
Indicators, 
2016 
+ 
Inflation   Inflation, GDP deflator, Annual 
percent 
WDI, 2016 _ 
Population POPG Population growth, annual 
percent 
WDI, 2016 + 
Degree of 
openness 
OPEN Sum of exports and imports of 
goods and services, percent of 
GDP 
WDI, 2016 + 
Urban 
population 
URPOP Growth rate of urban population 
 
WDI, 2016 + 
Source: Authors construction (2016) 
Economic stability is controlled by the inflation rate ( ) in the host countries 
(Al-Sadig, 2009 and Demirhan & Masca, 2008). A stable macroeconomic 
environment indicates less investment risk which in turn promotes FDI (Anywanu, 
2011). Thus, the expected relationship between FDI and inflation is negative. Also, 
a high degree of urbanization tends to encourage FDI inflows since it may imply a 
high quality of infrastructure and concentrated consumers (Al-Sadig, 2009). 
Indeed, concentrated consumers and concentrated services such as banking and 
communications, technological assets etc are always found in the cities. These 
externalities allow domestic enterprises and multinational firms to achieve 
efficiencies in production and service deliveries and economies of scale (Yin et al., 
2014). This paper uses the growth rate of urban population (URPOP) as a proxy for 
urbanization and it is expected to have a positive correlation with FDI. 
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Equally important, there has been growing interest in the role of institutions or 
legal framework and/or political structure in attracting FDI. According to 
Kaufmann et al., (1999a), the institutional variables include rule of law, regulatory 
quality, voice and accountability, political stability and absence of violence, 
government effectiveness and control of corruption. These indicators which are 
clustering into different dimensions allow us to examine whether some dimensions 
of governance matter for FDI location, while others do not. Kaufmann et al., 
(1999a) standardize them so that they all have mean zero and a standard deviation 
of one; in all cases larger values indicate better institutions. 
Indeed, like the other variables, the rule of law (RL) is the variable of most 
interest to this paper. The rule of law measures the extent to which agents have 
confidence in and abide by the rules of society, and in particular the quality of 
contract enforcement, property rights, the police, and the courts, as well as the 
likelihood of crime and violence (Kaufmann, et al., 2007). A central focus of the 
rule of law and FDI analysis rests on the significance of property rights and 
contract enforcement on investors’ decision to invest in a country. This is 
important because individuals and firms are incentivized to invest when these 
rights are secured. Thus, as articulated in much of the literature (for example 
Haggard & Tiede, 2011 and Hogan, 2015), all things being equal, a stronger rule of 
law will in principle encourage FDI by ensuring a transparent, stable and 
predictable environment in which host governments credibly commit to the 
enforcement of contracts and the protection of property rights and rights of the 
person. 
Regulation Quality (RQ) as an indicator of the quality institutions measures 
regulatory barriers to functioning markets. It reflects perceptions of the ability of 
the government to formulate and implement sound policies and regulations that 
permit and promote private sector development. The empirical study by Busse & 
Groizard (2006) discusses the impact of quality of government regulation of 
business on FDI. Specifically, Busse & Groizard (2006) show that, economies with 
high standards of regulation, have relatively less benefited from the multinational 
companies. These results are supported by Baklouti & Boujelbene (2014) who 
finds a negative relationship between the variables. 
Similarly, stable social and political environment strongly affects FDI and so 
this paper uses political stability and absence of violence/terrorism indicator to 
control for political stability (RISK). Political stability and absence of 
violence/terrorism measures the perceptions of the likelihood that the government 
will be destabilized or overthrown by unconstitutional or violent means, including 
politically-motivated violence and terrorism. Thus, by its very nature, the FDI 
decision requires some assessment of the political future of the host country. This 
is due to the fact that it is a forward-looking activity based on investors' 
expectations regarding future returns and the confidence that they can place on 
these returns (Brada, et al., 2004). Thus, domestic instability or civil war or conflict 
with neighboring countries may reduce the profitability of operating in the host 
country because domestic sales are impaired, or production is disrupted, or the 
facility is damaged or destroyed (Brada, et al., 2004). Also, political instability is 
likely to affect the value of the host country's currency, thus reducing the value of 
the assets invested in the host country as well as of the future profits generated by 
the investment (Brada, et al., 2004). Indeed, a number of studies examine the 
significance of political risk for investment decision (Citron & Nickelsburg, 1987; 
Cherian & Perotti, 2001; Fielding, 2003; Alesina & Perotti, 1996; Bennett & 
Green, 1972; Schneider & Frey, 1985; Singh & Jun, 1995; Globerman & Shapiro, 
2002 and Cho, 2003) and find that an increase in the intensity of political 
instability significantly decreases investment. Moreover, Diamonte et al. (1996) 
show that political risk is a more important determinant of asset returns in 
emerging markets than in developed markets whereas Bussiere & Mulder (1999) 
conclude that including political variables in economic models significantly 
improves the ability of such models to explain economic crises (see also Brada, et 
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al., 2004). By and large, this variable combines indicators that measure the risk of a 
destabilization or removal from power of the government in a violent or 
unconstitutional way.  
Government effectiveness (GE) as an indicator of the effectiveness of policy, 
reflects perceptions of the quality of public services, the quality of the civil service 
and the degree of its independence from political pressures, the quality of policy 
formulation and implementation, and the credibility of the government's 
commitment to such policies. It measures the competence of the state bureaucracy 
and the quality of public services. This variable is expected to have a positive 
effect on FDI. This augment is supported by (Bénassy-Quéré et al., 2007 and 
Baklouti & Boujelbene, 2014). The indicators clustered in government 
effectiveness and in regulatory quality are related to the ability of the government 
to formulate and implement policies. 
Voice and accountability focuses on different indicators related to the political 
process, civil rights, and institutions that facilitate citizens’ control of government 
actions, such as media independence while the control of corruption measures the 
extent to which public power is exercised for private grain, including both petty 
and grand forms of corruption. Both indices range from -2.5 to 2.5, with higher 
values corresponding to better quality of institutions. In general, many empirical 
studies show that the quality of institutions has positive effects on FDI (see for 
example, Daude & Stein, 2004). According to Belgibayeva & Plekhanov (2015), 
with full control of corruption, paying a bribe is prohibitively costly. This also 
suggests that FDI inflows increase with the control of corruption. 
The graphical descriptions of the quality of institutions measures namely voice 
and accountability, political stability and absence of violence/terrorism, 
government effectiveness, and regulatory quality, rule of law and control of 
corruption for the East African countries are presented in Figures 7-12. These 
indicators are very important as they seem to associate with FDI inflows.  
 
 
Figure 7. Voice and Accountability 
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Figure 8. Political Stability and Absence of Violence/Terrorism 
 
 
Figure 9. Government Effectiveness 
 
 
Figure 10. Regulatory Quality 
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Figure 11. Rule of Law 
 
 
Figure 12. Control of Corruption 
 
Among the five countries, Rwanda seems to have a remarkable improvement in 
political stability and absence of violence/terrorism, government effectiveness, 
regulatory quality, rule of law and control of corruption while Burundi tends to lag 
behind in terms of the quality of its institutions. The fact that some explanatory 
variables such as indicators of quality of institutions seem to have correlation, these 
variables are included in the models as reported in Table 5 to avoided the problems 
of multicollinearity and endogeneity. 
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Table 5. Variables Included in the Models 
Variable Abbrev
. 
 Models  
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
Foreign direct investment  FDI         
Corruption CPI         
Market size GDPPC         
Growth GDPG         
Voice and Accountability  VA         
Political stability & absence of violence PV         
Government effectiveness  GE         
Regulatory quality RQ         
Rule of law RL         
Control of corruption CC         
Inflation           
Population POPG         
Degree of openness OPEN         
Urban population URPOP         
Note:  included in the model,  not included in the model 
Source: Authors construction (2016) 
 
In all models, the dependent variable is the ratio of FDI inflow to population. In 
the first six models, we use CPI as a measure of the level of corruption. In the last 
two models we use control of corruption as an indicator of the level of the 
corruption in the economy. The two measures are applied separately because of 
their strong correlation. Likewise, in models 1 and 8, we exclude GDP per capita 
because some previous studies show that when GDP per capita and CPI are put 
together they are not significant at 0.05 level (see for example Ohlsson, 2007). This 
suggests that there is a positive correlation between GDP per capita and CPI.  
General, countries with higher GDP per capita have lower levels of corruption, or 
that countries with lower levels of corruption in general have higher levels of GDP 
per capita (Ohlsson, 2007). In the same manner, control of corruption is an 
indicator of the quality of institutions limiting corruption.  
 
4. The Data and Country Sample 
This paper employs panel data for 5 East African countries namely Burundi, 
Kenya, Rwanda, Tanzania and Uganda over the 1996-2015 period. The paper uses 
FDI per capita, measured in current U.S. dollars divided by the host country’s total 
population as the dependent variable. FDI inflows are obtained from United 
Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) and World Bank’s 
World Development Indicators (WDI 2016) while total population of the 
appropriate country is obtained from (WDI 2016). Data on corruption, indexed 
from 0 (highly corrupt) to 10 (very clean) are obtained from Transparency 
International (2016). With respect to the control variables, data on GDP per capita 
(measured in current U.S. dollars), the growth rate of GDP, the degree of openness, 
the inflation rate, population growth rate and the growth rate of urban population 
come from WDI (2006). To capture the effect of democracy of the host country on 
FDI, the paper uses rule of law.  Also, to capture the effect of the institutional 
quality, regulatory quality is used. Institutional quality indicators are from the 
World Bank’s World Bank Governance, and they range from -2.5 to 2.5. Because 
high levels of correlation between the explanatory variables may lead into 
multicorreneality problem we check whether the explanatory variables have high 
levels of correlation. In a case when correlation between explanatory variables is in 
excess of 0.8 it may be the best decision to drop some of the variables which 
represent the similar information about FDI.  
Analytically, Baltagi (2005) recommends the use of fixed effect (FE) for a panel 
with a small N (in our case, N=5) because for large N, the regression includes (N-
1) dummies that lead to a large loss of degrees of freedom equal to (N-1). In 
addition, we use the F-test to test for the significance of the country effects, that is, 
the null hypothesis that all country dummy coefficients are equal. When the test is 
significant, it means that the country dummies are jointly significant. 
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5. Empirical Findings 
5.1. Descriptive Statistics and Correlation Coefficients 
As has been stated, descriptive analysis and correlation coefficients are 
employed to ascertain the statistical properties of the variables used in the 
empirical analysis. Tables 6 and 7 respectively present the descriptive analysis and 
correlations of the variables included in the models. The summary statistics show 
that data for the five countries over the 1996-2015 period, giving rise to 100 
observations. The values of the standard deviations, suggest that the variables are 
worth including in the regressions. Similarly, the statistics suggest that there are no 
outliers since the mean of each variable is relatively close to its mean. Furthermore, 
in Table 6, the values of skewness and kurtosis show the normality test. For a 
variable to be normally distributed the skewness value should be equal to zero 
whereas the kurtosis value should be three. Specifically, skewness gives a measure 
of how symmetric the observations are about the mean while kurtosis gives a 
measure of the thickness in the tails of a probability density function. However, it 
is also important to note that the Jarque-Bera (JB) test for normality is the one that 
computes the skewness and kurtosis measures of the OLS residuals. Under the null 
hypothesis of normal distribution, if the calculated p-value of the JB statistic is 
greater than 0.05, we fail to reject the null hypothesis at 5 percent level of 
significance. 
The Table shows the results of the normally test for the variables: foreign 
direct investment per capita (FDI), corruption (CPI), market size (GDPPC), growth 
(GDPG), voice and accountability (VA), political stability & absence of violence 
(PV), government effectiveness (GE), regulatory quality (RQ), rule of law (RL), 
control of corruption (CC), inflation( ), population growth (POPG), degree of 
openness (OPEN), and urban population growth (URPOP). It is observed that rule 
of law, political stability and absence of violence, voice and accountability; and 
gross domestic product per capita are normally distributed because their skewness 
is approximately equal to zero as they are less than 0.5 in absolute terms. Also, it is 
clear that the calculated p-value of these variables plus degree of openness is 
greater than significance level, 0.05, suggesting that there is no evidence to reject 
the null hypothesis of a normal distribution for the variables. However, FDI per 
capita, corruption perception index, population growth, urban population, GDP 
growth, inflation, government effectiveness, regulatory quality and control of 
corruption do not follow a normal distribution as their p-value is less than 0.05.  
Some of the variables such FDI are transformed into log to reduce the severity of 
non-normality problem. 
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As far as correlation is concerned, results in Table 7 suggest that there is a 
positive correlation between FDI per capita and a number of independent variables 
such as CPI, GDP per capita, political and violence, government effectiveness, 
regulatory quality and rule of law. The positive correlation between FDI and CPI 
suggests that FDI is high in clean economy and less in highly corrupt economy, 
this illustration is correct because CPI ranges from 0 to 10 to imply highly corrupt 
to very clean economies. In the same manner, a positive correlation between FDI 
and governance indicators suggests that FDI inflow is high in economies with good 
governance. Other variables such as population, inflation, degree of openness, 
voice and accountability and control of corruption seem to have a low correlation 
with FDI pa capita. Notwithstanding these correlations do not necessarily mean 
causations. In addition, pair-wise correlations can be spurious, reflecting the effect 
of the presence of unobserved country effects. Thus, it is very important to 
examine these relationships in a multivariate regression analysis. In this case, 
control variables that are considered key determinants of FDI inflows should be 
included.  
Interestingly, the correlation matrix shows low correlations among the 
explanatory variables except for CPI and control of corruption on one hand, and 
among governance indicators on the other hand. These variables have correlation 
coefficient of 0.8 or more. To avoid the problem of multicollineriality problem we 
developed eight models with inclusion of one governance indicator for each model. 
Similarly, CPI and control of corruption are applied exclusively.  
 
5.2. Regression Results 
Table 8 reports the results of the fixed effects regressions that examine the 
impact of corruption and other control variables on FDI inflows. In all 8 
regressions, the dependent variable is the net FDI inflow per capita. As presented 
above, we develop 8 panel models with inclusion of one governance indicators in 
each so as to avoid the problem of multicollineriality. In addition, in some 
regressions we eliminate GDP per capita because of revealed positive correlation 
between corruption and GDP per capita. Indeed, when excluding GDP per capita as 
a proxy for market size, the CPI and CC coefficients in model 1 and model 8 
respectively are statistically significant in both regressions and with expected sign. 
Specifically, positive relationship between CPI and FDI suggests that FDI 
increases as the economies move from highly corrupt to very clean. Similarly, the 
positive coefficient for the CC suggests that FDI rises as control of corruption as an 
indicator of the quality of institutions limiting corruption improves. Overall, these 
results suggest a negative impact of corruption on FDI inflows. 
When including GDP per capita, as in regressions 2-7, both CPI and CC turn to 
be statistically insignificant. In fact, the non significance of corruption indicator is 
not that surprising. Some studies, for example, Blancheton & Opara-Opimba 
(2010); Harrison (2011) and Udenze (2014) reveal that the corruption factor is not 
clearly significant. Nonetheless, the augment has been not because of significant 
correlation between corruption measures and GDP per capita. In Africa, corruption 
has high political and bureaucratic slant which in turn affects mostly public aid or 
financial loan than it does to private capital. Evidence for in support of this 
position, can be found in Blancheton & Opara-Opimba (2010). 
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Despite these contradictory results, market size, measured as GDP per capita, 
seems to be the most important factor in explaining FDI in East Africa. If included 
in the regression, the GDP per capita is positive and statistically significant at 0.01 
level in all regressions. Notably, the size of a market may indicate the 
attractiveness of a specific location for the investment, in the case that the 
multinational corporation aims to produce for the local market (horizontal or 
market-seeking FDI). Also, our estimates reveal that FDI is influenced by the 
degree of openness and macroeconomic stability. In all regressions, the coefficient 
for the trade openness is positive and statistically significant suggesting that 
economies which are more open are likely to attract foreign firms. Indeed, more 
open economies potentially offer a more efficient allocation of resources, providing 
economic welfare gains. Equally important, these results are also consistent with 
the FDI theory that openness is indicative of the host country’s ease of access to 
the world market for material inputs, so the multinational corporations can obtain 
the raw materials at low price (see also Anyanwu, 2011). In contrast, the 
coefficient for inflation, which represents economic stability, is negative and 
statistically significant in all regressions suggesting that economic instability may 
inhibit inward FDI, because investors prefer to invest in economies with a lesser 
degree of uncertainty and in more stable economies. In other words, a stable 
macroeconomic environment promotes FDI by showing less investment risk. These 
results are consistent with the existing literature. 
Other significant factors in our analysis are governance indicators. With the 
exception of voice and accountability, the other indicators namely political stability 
and absence of violence, government effectiveness, regulatory quality, and rule of 
law are significant determinants of the ability of the host country to attract FDI. 
Remarkably, the coefficients for these variables are positive and statistically 
significant at 0.01 level. This suggests that foreign investors prefer to invest in the 
economies that are politically and socially stable. It also suggests that the quality of 
public services and the quality of the civil service and the degree of its 
independence from political pressures play an important role in attracting foreign 
investors. Furthermore, the results imply that the quality of contract enforcement, 
property rights, as well as the likelihood of crime and violence affect FDI inflows 
positively. Also, when excluding GDP per capita in the regression, the coefficient 
of control of corruption in model 8 becomes statistically significant at 0.01 level, 
suggesting that FDI inflows increase if corruption is controlled. Again, this result 
confirms the previous studies, which find a negative relationship between the 
corruption level in the host country and FDI inflows. By and large, governance 
performance indicators are in the best position of attracting more FDI inflows. 
These indicators tend to evaluate the quality of the service, independence from the 
political pressure and quality of the policy formulations. More importantly, positive 
relationship between FDI and political stability and absence of violence, 
government effectiveness, and regulatory quality, rule of law and control of 
corruption provides an indication of the importance of the quality of institutions. 
This means that if the economy has good quality institutions, it may still be able to 
attract more FDI inflows despite its level of corruption (see also Al-Sadig, 2009). 
There is also, however, a further point to be considered. Contrary to 
expectations, the coefficients for the overall population growth, urban population, 
and economic growth are statistically insignificant in all regression. In fact, the 
counter argument that real growth is not always significant is supported by 
UNCTAD (1998). 
 
6. Conclusions 
It is widely accepted that FDIs are the most desirable form of capital inflows to 
low income economies because they are less susceptible to crises and sudden stops. 
However, there are many factors that could affect FDI inflows. The level of 
corruption in the host economies has been introduced as one of the important 
factors determining FDI location. In fact, the effects of corruption on FDI have 
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received attention in socio-economic literature. Interestingly, some empirical 
studies provide evidence of a negative relationship between corruption and FDI 
inflows, while others fail to find such a relationship. Also, a matter of great 
concern is that some empirical works reveal positive and statistically significant 
association between the two variables. A central concern of this paper was to 
examine the effects of corruption on FDI inflows. The paper used corruption 
perception index and control of corruption as measures or indicators of the level of 
corruption in the economy. Besides, economic factors such as GDP per capita, 
population, inflation, and openness of the economy and non-economic factors such 
as the quality of institutions were considered in the analysis as determinants of FDI 
inflows in East African economy. For analysis, the paper employed fixed effects as 
a preferable model and it used data for 5 countries over the 1996-2015 period. The 
empirical evidence revealed in this paper can be presented as follows: When 
eliminating GDP per capita in the regression the coefficients for the corruption 
perception index and control of corruption are positive and statistically significant. 
Indeed, these regressions are consistent with the argument that corruption deters 
foreign investors. However, when including GDP per capita, both coefficients 
become statistically insignificant, this may be due to the fact that corruption also 
affects GDP per capita. Unsurprisingly, empirical results show that the market size 
proxied by GDP per capita and quality of institutions or governance indicators 
namely political voice and absence of violence, government effectiveness and rule 
of law are the main factors that determine FDI inflows in East African economy. 
These results provide an important strategy for increase in FDI inflows. Economies 
may attract more FDI if they take effective measures to improve the quality of 
institutions and combat corruption. Economies may attract more FDI if they take 
effective measures to increase GDP per capita, improve the quality of institutions 
and combat corruption. 
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